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By doug TennenT*
Ethical investing in commercial activities is a topic which has received considerable attention of 
late. This has occurred in the areas of company law at all levels, with the concerns of consumers 
in relation to the production of products, and also in trust law, in particular superannuation trusts. 
Superannuation Trusts are of particular significance as they have become significant institutional 
investors in a number of substantial commercial activities. Ethical investment which requires the 
trustees to take account of issues other than financial when investing is seen to run counter to 
traditional trust law principles. Relevant issues relating to ethical investing include: human rights 
and labour concerns, environmental and moral issues such as investing in the alcohol and tobacco 
industries. This paper focusing upon superannuation law in the Australian and New Zealand juris-
dictions considers the investment obligations of trustees in superannuation trusts. Such obligations 
closely resemble what may be referred to as traditional or core obligations of trustees. It acknowl-
edges that difficulties arise when attempting to include ethical considerations in investment deci-
sions with trust property. Having acknowledged this, the paper in upholding the place of ethical 
investing in the current environment proceeds to outline a means by which ethical investing can 
be adopted without compromising the position of trustees in any manner and which still focuses 
upon the best financial interests of the beneficiaries.
i. TrusT Law
It is commonly stated that the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property while the beneficiary 
is the equitable owner. This arrangement establishes the basis of a fiduciary relationship between 
the trustee and the beneficiary. Fiduciaries are required to act in the best interests of their ben-
eficiaries.1 They must not allow personal interest and duty to conflict.2 Self interest must be set 
aside for the interests of the beneficiaries. The basis of this relationship is that the fiduciary by 
virtue (in the present case the trustee) of being given the discretionary power to manage property 
on behalf of the beneficiary, is in a position of power.3 The power comes about by virtue of the 
discretion held by a trustee to manage the property of behalf of the beneficiary. The trustee may 
through investment and other decisions manage the property in a manner which either advances 
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the interests of the beneficiary or undermines them. Equity requires that trustees act in a manner 
which advances their interests.4
A beneficiary is a volunteer to a trust. This means that a beneficiary has provided no consider-
ation for the trust entitlement.5 The equitable maxim that equity will not assist a volunteer is well 
established and acknowledged.6 However once a trust is established,7 is it also acknowledged that 
a beneficiary has a proprietary interest in the trust property and can as such enforce that interest 
against the trustee.8 As Lord Millet noted in Armitage v Nurse9 the fact that there is an irreduc-
ible core of obligations owed by the trustees to the beneficiaries makes it central to trust law that 
such obligations are enforceable.10 This right of enforcement has received statutory codification 
in different jurisdictions.11 However there are differing degrees of interest that a beneficiary holds 
in a trust. These range from a beneficiary with a fixed interest in a trust to a beneficiary of a dis-
cretionary trust where trustees are given the discretion to select beneficiaries from selected groups 
of people.12 The beneficiary with a fixed interest has a propriety interest in the trust which can be 
enforced.13 The discretionary beneficiary does not enjoy a propriety interest and the only power of 
enforcement is to ensure that trustees exercise their discretion fairly, or reasonably or properly.14 
The extent of the beneficial interest and the associated right of enforcement is significant when 
one comes to consider superannuation trusts. While in general trusts the beneficiary is a volunteer 
to the trust, this technically is not the situation with beneficiaries of contributory superannuation 
scheme. As noted by Warner J in Mettroy Pension Trustees v Evans15 beneficiaries under a pen-
sion scheme where contributions are made are not volunteers. The contributions are totally de-
rived from their work as an employee.16 Warner J proceeds to note:
The rights of beneficiaries of a pension scheme have contractual and commercial origins. They have been 
derived from contracts of employment of the members. The benefits under the scheme have been earned 
by the service of the members under those contracts.17
The acknowledgement of a contractual relationship within the pension/superannuation trust rela-
tionship coming about through the regular financial contribution on the part of the beneficiary is 
significant and could be said to give a superannuation trust a special status. Here it is important to 
note an observation of Richardson J from the New Zealand jurisdiction in Re UEB Industries Ltd 
Pension Plan:
4 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (HCA) 203.
5 This represents one of the key differences between a contractual relationship and a trust relationship. In contract law 
consideration is perhaps the most essential ingredient of a contractual relationship.
6 As stated in Pennington v Waine [2002] 4 ALL ER 215, 227.
7 It often becomes the role of the court to determine whether or not a trust relationship exists.
8 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] 2 All ER 961, 988.
9 Armitage v Nurse [1997] 2 All ER 705.
10 Ibid.
11 For example in New Zealand Trustees Act 1956 s 66 allows any person with a beneficial interest in the property who 
is aggrieved by an act or omission of the trustee to apply to the court to review the act or omission.
12 Perhaps the most famous example of this is McPhail v Doulton (In re Baden’s Deed Trusts) [1971] AC 424.
13 Andrew Butler Equity and Trusts in New Zealand, (2003), 56.
14 Gartside v IRC [1968] 1 All ER 121, 134.
15 Mettroy Pension Trustees v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587, 1610.
16 David Hayton Pension Trusts and Traditional Trusts; Drastically Different Species of Trust [2005] 69 Conv, 229, 
230.
17 Mettroy Pension Trustees v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587, 1610.
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Pension plans are different in nature from traditional trusts. There is an interrelationship of contract law 
and trust law in any pension scheme…. In commercial terms a pension plan of this kind is fundamentally 
a contract entered into by an employer to fund the payment of defined benefits to members of the plan 
and their dependants.18
The existence of a trust gives rise to a fiduciary obligation of the part of the trustee to act in the 
best interest of the beneficiaries. A contract gives rise to rights and obligations as defined by the 
terms and conditions of the contract. In a superannuation fund a beneficiary provides considera-
tion through his/her contribution to the scheme through part of his/her wages.19 The deferment of 
wages through the contribution to the scheme could also be said to be another manner in which the 
beneficiary is providing consideration.20 The provision of consideration establishes on the part of 
the beneficiary a legitimate expectation that contractual rights will be fulfilled. A fiduciary obliga-
tion coupled with a contractual obligation on the part of the trustees establishes, it is submitted, 
significant rights and expectations on the part of the beneficiaries, rights which exceed those of 
other beneficiaries of a traditional trust. This point is emphasized as it has important relevance in 
terms of the investing powers and obligations on the part of the trustees. The requirement to invest 
in the best interests of the beneficiaries is clearly of significant relevance when issues of ethical 
investment are raised with regards to the investment of superannuation funds.
ii. TrusT Law and invesTmenT
The investment obligations on the part of the trustees was considered in some depth in the now 
seminal case of Cowan and Others v Scargill and Others.21 This case concerned the investment 
of trust funds of the Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme. The funds totalled some £300 million, with 
some £200 million available for investment every year.22 The Committee of Management which 
had wide powers of investment had ten trustees. Five were appointed by the Board and five were 
appointed by the National Union of Mineworkers. The trustees adopted a formal investment plan 
which included investments in oil, overseas investment, and the acquisition of land overseas. Such 
plans were strongly objected to by the Union representatives on the basis that they were in direct 
conflict with Union policy.23 It was concluded by the Judge, Sir Robert Megarry that the Union 
trustees were mainly, if not solely activated by a desire to pursue union policy.24 The opposition 
and censuring of the proposed investment strategy resulted in deadlocked board. As there was no 
casting vote, the matter came before the courts.25 The non union trustees were concerned that such 
censuring meant that they were unable to diversify the fund so as to maximize the return for ben-
eficiaries by investing domestically and abroad.26
18 Re UEB Industries Ltd Pension Plan [1992] 1 NZLR 294, 298.
19 Imperial Group Pension v Imperial Tobacco [1991] 2 All ER 597.
20 This is sometimes referred to as executory consideration. This is where a person makes a payment for a benefit that 
can be expected to be received in the future.
21 Cowan and Others v Scargill and Others [1985] 1 Ch 270.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid 279.
24 Ibid 294.
25 Justice Margaret Stone, ‘The Superannuation Trustee: are Fiduciary obligations and Standards Appropriate?’ (2007) 
1, Journal of Equity, 167.
26 Ibid 286.
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In considering the situation Sir Robert Megarry reemphasized some of the basic principles of 
trust law. That is that the paramount duty of the trustees is to represent and promote the best inter-
ests of the beneficiaries.27 Such a requirement is only qualified by a requirement to comply with 
the laws of the jurisdiction.28 The beneficiaries’ best interests usually means their best financial 
interests.29 This requires an investment strategy which considers the risk of particular investments 
against the acquisition of income and capital appreciation of the assets of the trust.30 This requires 
the trustees to put aside their own personal interests and views including strongly held social or 
political views.31 This would include during the apartheid era an opposition to apartheid; opposi-
tion to the manufacturing of armaments and to the production of tobacco and alcohol.32 Therefore, 
when exercising their powers and duties as trustees, if such investments would yield returns and 
long term capital appreciation to an extent that was greater than other investments, then there was 
an obligation to undertake such investments. In this manner we are seeing the fiduciary obliga-
tion being imposed in a slightly different way. The obligation not to allow duty to conflict with 
interest usually refers to the self interests of a fiduciary seeking to advance his/her own financial 
or business interests. However self interest in this context refers to a fiduciary’s moral, social and 
political views. Such views must not conflict with the obligation to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries of the trust. This establishes an interesting new dimension to the fiduciary obligation 
reflecting the flexibility and adaptability of its application.
As noted in advancing their position, the Union trustees were focused upon advancing and 
implementing union policy rather than promoting the best interests of the beneficiaries. Sir Robert 
did acknowledge that if all of the beneficiaries of a superannuation trust held strong views about 
alcohol, armaments or certain types of entertainment, then it would not be in their best interests 
to invest in enterprises involved in such activities. He proceeded to observe however, that such 
situations where there would be consensus ad idem amongst all of the beneficiaries on ethical or 
moral issues would be very rare.33 He also acknowledged that a strong case could be mounted to 
argue that the outflow of significant funds from the country through overseas investment is detri-
mental to the domestic economy.34 However for such a position to be justified careful articulation 
and linkage to the pension scheme in particular was required. How would the clear selection of 
domestic rather than foreign investment benefit the local economy and in turn the beneficiaries of 
the trust? It was noted that although the scheme was large it had not been shown how such invest-
ment restrictions could influence the national economy in a positive manner.35 Further the restric-
tion was excluding a very significant area of potential investments and was not conducive to the 
requirement to diversify investments.36
As noted the focus of the beneficiaries was to promote the Union policy. Sir Robert Megarry 
having considered Arthur Scargill’s submissions concluded that there was no explanation as to 
27 Ibid 287.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid 288.
34 Ibid 295.
35 Ibid 296.
36 Ibid diversification of investment is a central priority for a trustee when investing in trust property.
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how or why it was in the best interests of the beneficiaries to put union policy into force through 
imposing the investment prohibitions.37
While Sir Robert Megarry is clear in his views about the focus of investment in the benefici-
aries financial interests, the decision does contain an acknowledgement of the possibility of the 
promotion of arguments that:
investing in a country with repressive policies might infact be investing in a fragile economy 
and therefore not in the long term best interests of the beneficiaries; and
that overseas investment might not be beneficial to the national economy which the pension 
scheme operates under.38
However for such argument to be upheld, clear and careful articulation would be required to high-
light how such investment decisions would provide specific benefits to the superannuation scheme 
under consideration. Such articulation effectively linking benefits to a specific scheme through a 
particular ‘ethical investment strategy’ is clearly difficult given the size of an economy such as the 
United Kingdom.
This raises the question: is it possible to apply principles of ethical investment to superan-
nuation trusts in the absence of specific statutory codification requiring that such investment be 
undertaken? This will be the focus of the next part of the paper. It is firstly necessary to consider 
the investment obligations in more detail. Then the principles of ethical investment will then be 
discussed and critiqued. This will lead to the development of an argument that there can be some 
form of marriage between commercial prudent investment on the part of the trustees while at the 
same time complying with stated ethical standards. Such a marriage must be carefully articulated.
iii. invesTmenT sTraTegies
As noted, trustees are required to adopt an investment strategy which is in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries. The best interests, unless a trust deed would suggest otherwise, means the best 
financial interests of the beneficiaries or members of a superannuation or pension scheme. Such 
obligations have been codified into different pieces of legislation. In Australia, section 52 the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 199339 sets out covenants which are to be included 
in the governing rules of Superannuation entities. The two which are of particular relevance to 
investment are:
(2)(b) which sets out the requirement to exercise the same degree of care, skill and diligence as an ordi-
nary prudent person would exercise in dealing with property for another for whom the person felt morally 
bound to provide;40
(2)(f) this sets out the requirement to formulate and give effect to an investment strategy having regard to 
the circumstances of the entity as a whole. Regard needs to be given to;
the risks relating to certain investments;
the composition of the entity’s investments as a whole taking into account the adequacy of 
diversification;
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid 295.
39 This is the legislation which provides the legislatory regime to regulate superannuation schemes.
40 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(2)(b).
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the liquidity of the entity’s investments.41 In terms of the investment strategy, provision is 
made for a specified beneficiary(s) to give direction to the trustees with regards to particular 
assets of the fund.42
Further section 62(1)(a)(i) of the same legislation requires that a superannuation fund must be 
maintained solely for one or more of the following purposes… the provision of benefits for each 
member of the fund on or after the members retirement. This is a particularly practical and focused 
purpose. In promoting this purpose the trustees are focusing upon the best financial interests of 
the beneficiaries which in the context of superannuation law is the provision of a adequate income 
for the beneficiaries upon retirement. Consequently it has been argued by Sir Robert Meggary in 
Cowan that taking account of moral factors other than maximization of return and capital appre-
ciation is not acting in the beneficiaries best interests.43 This is a view which found support some 
ten years later from Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead.44
The consideration of risk, expected return and the required diversification to manage this 
which is central to an investment strategy has been codified in section 52 of the Superannuation 
Industry (Supervision) Act. In taking account of this trustees are required to adopt the position of 
the ordinary prudent person. It needs to be noted that the phase that has been adopted is ‘prudent 
person’ and not ‘prudent business person’.45 As Lord Nicholls notes the ordinary prudent person 
is a creation of equity and has his/her counterpart with the reasonable person in common law.46 
While Lord Nicholls might argue the ordinary prudent person threshold only requires the adop-
tion of minimal standards and allows for certain errors,47 such comments need to be considered in 
the context of the other Covenant obligations set out in section 52 of the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993. These include the minimal standards with regards to an investment strat-
egy,48 to act honestly,49 in the best interests of the beneficiaries,50 and to allow a beneficiary access 
to any prescribed information or any prescribed documents.51 The different obligations taken to-
gether create significant legal expectations on the part of trustees including in particular the adop-
tion of appropriate and effective investment strategies.
It seems to be accepted today that the appropriate means of giving effect to the prudent inves-
tor rule is through what is known as modern portfolio theory.52 This theory enables trustees to 
determine both expected returns of an asset together with the volatility of or risk attached to that 
41 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(2)(f).
42 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(4).
43 Cowan and Others v Scargill and Others [1985] 1 Ch 270, 287.
44 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, ‘Trustees and Their Broader Community: Where Duty, Morality and Ethics Converge’, 
The Australian Law Journal, Vol 70, March 1996, 205, 211.
45 Such a phase has been adopted in other jurisdictions. See for example New Zealand Trustee Act 1956 s 13(D).
46 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, ‘Trustees and Their Broader Community: Where Morality and Ethics Converge’, Aus-
tralian Law Journal, March 1996 Vol 8 205, 210.
47 Ibid.
48 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(1)(f).
49 Ibid s 52(1)(a).
50 Ibid s 52(2)(c).
51 Ibid s 52(2)(h).
52 Paul U Ali and Gold M An Appraisal of Socially Responsible Investment for Trustees and Other Investment Fiduciar-
ies, (Research Paper, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation) June 2002.
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particular asset.53 This is done by considering the different possible outcomes for an investment 
and the degree of variation of such outcomes.54 Trustees when investing, invest in a number of 
different activities. The combination of these different investments is known as an investment 
portfolio.55 A balanced and well considered portfolio allows for a balance of the minimization of 
risk while at the same time achieving the maximization of return. A spread of assets allows for 
the minimization of risk.56 As Lord Nicholls notes, risk is managed across a balanced portfolio, 
incorporating a prudent mixture of low and higher risk assets.57 In this regard the degree of risk of 
the combined assets when considering the investment portfolio as a whole should be less than the 
degree of risk of individual investments.58 In other words the investment in stable low risk activi-
ties should effectively counter balance any investment risk in higher risk or volatile activities.
If the duty of investment in this regard is to realise the beneficiaries’ financial interests through 
providing an adequate retirement income, then careful considerations of variance of risk or return 
when considered in the light of the totality of investments does not leave a great deal of room for 
account to be given to ethical considerations. Further as noted by Lord Nicholls:
If the trust was created to confer financial benefits on individuals, a decision not to maximize those finan-
cial benefits but to promote moral objectives on which widely differing views are held is, by definition, 
not to advance the purposes of the trust and, hence is not in the best interests of the beneficiaries under 
that trust.59
The learned Judge proceeds to note that if moral objectives become a material consideration in 
investment strategies, this amounts to a significant shift from benefiting the named beneficiaries 
of the trust specifically to the benefiting of the community as a whole to which the beneficiary 
belongs.60 This, as Sir Robert Megarry would agree is not ad idem with the purposes of traditional 
trust law. Adopting the approach of Sir Robert Megarry in Cowan the only way that such an ap-
proach could be in accord with traditional trust law would be for trustees to show that the benefits 
conveyed to the community through the ethical investments could be translated into positive in-
vestment outcomes for the beneficiaries.61 However it would appear that from a completely eco-
nomic perspective any restriction of investment based on ethical or other grounds will have some 
detrimental impact upon investment returns through limitation of investment choice.62 While this 
53 Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investments: A Case of Disjointed Thinking’, Cambridge Law Journal 67 (2) July 2008, 
396, 399.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid 400.
56 Ibid.
57 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, ‘Trustees and Their Broader Community: Where Morality and Ethics Converge’, 
(1995) 9(3) Trust Law International, 71, 76.
58 Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investment: a Case of Disjointed Thinking’, Cambridge Law Journal, 67(2) July 2008, 396, 
400. As Thornton notes: ‘Some combinations of assets will be more effective than others in reducing the overall risk 
of the portfolio. For example if two assets are likely to perform well under opposite market conditions or at different 
times, then dividing the fund between these two should substantial reduce the degree of risk.’
59 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, ‘Trustees and Their Broader Community: Where Duty, Morality and Ethics Converge’, 
The Australian Law Journal, March 1996 Vol 70 205, 211.
60 Ibid.
61 Cowan and Others v Scargill and Others [1985] 1 Ch 270, 295-296.
62 Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investments: a Case of Disjointed Thinking’, Cambridge Law Journal, 67 (2) July 2008, 
396, 409.
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position is certainly not adopted by all commentators63 in the field, trustees are prima facie placing 
themselves in a very vulnerable position if they are to take account of ethical decisions without 
being given some mandate to do so by for example the trust deed.
The issue becomes therefore: how does one take account of ethical considerations in superan-
nuation trust investment in a manner which does not compromise the financial interests of the 
beneficiaries and increase the risk of legal liability upon the trustees?
iv. The Basis for eThicaL invesTmenT and The underLying reasoning for 
superannuaTion funds To Take accounT of such consideraTions
According to Donnan J ethical investing from its broadest perspective is the commitment to an 
alignment of a person’s personal values and social concerns with investment practices.64 Rosy 
Thornton differentiates between a socially dictated policy and a socially sensitive policy in terms 
of investment.65 A socially dictated policy is one which uses predetermined ethical considerations 
to limit or determine the selection of investment assets, such considerations taking precedence 
over commercial factors.66 A socially sensitive policy allows ethical considerations to come into 
play when choosing between investments which appear equivalently attractive according to nor-
mal financial criteria.67 It would appear that the socially dictated policy would offend against the 
requirement of the trustees to act in the beneficiaries financial interests. The socially sensitive 
strategy however seems to be somewhat limited in its effectiveness in promoting ethical invest-
ment. Under this strategy should an investment in an entity involved in armaments production pro-
vide a more attractive rate of return, then the investment in the armaments supportive enterprise 
would prevail. Donnan’s approach of aligning personal values and social concerns with invest-
ment practices, while allowing for a certain amount of flexibility, aligns itself most closely with 
the socially dictated policy approach. The Donnan approach could still lead to potential conflict 
between the traditional obligations of a trustee and the requirement to invest ethically. Given this 
clear potential for conflict, if the requirement to ethically invest is to be justified, solid arguments 
need to be advanced to support such justification. Two such arguments are now advanced.
A. The Growing Focus on Environmental and Social Issues
It can be said that there is an increasing consciousness of and concern over environmental, social 
and human rights issues when considering corporate behaviour.68 This concern is reflected in a 
number of ways. It is useful, indeed important to offer two examples.
63 For example M Scott Donald and Nicholas Taylor, ‘Does “Sustainable” Investing Compromise the obligations 
owed by Superannuation Trustees?’ (2008) 36 ABLR 47, 53. They argue that empirical evidence suggests that shares 
in companies pursuing sustainable business practices are unlikely to generate returns statistically different from any 
other shares when account is taken of different operational risks, different industries, capital structure and so on.
64 Donnan J ‘Regulating Ethical Investment: Disclosure Under the Financial Services Reform Act’ (2002) 13 JBFLP 
155, 156.
65 Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investments: a Case of Disjointed Thinking’, Cambridge Law Journal, 67(2) July 2008, 396, 
401.
66 Emphasis added by author.
67 Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investments: a Case of Disjointed Thinking’, Cambridge Law Journal, 67 (2) July 2008, 
396, 402.
68 Paul U Ali ‘Ethical Finance: Can Ethical objectives be Achieved Through Financial Investments?’ (2008) 26 C&SLJ, 
127.
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The first is the fact that there has over recent years been a shift in the position of the consum-
ing community towards expecting company’s to adopt ethical standards in decision making with 
regards to the appropriate priorities set by the company boards in their decision making. This is 
evidenced through a number of studies. For example a 1995 study carried out on behalf of a Ca-
nadian Labour Union indicated that over 92 per cent of Canadians would choose to buy products 
made ethically if given the choice between ‘ethical’ and regular products. 89 per cent said that 
they would pay more for clothing produced under ethical conditions and over two thirds would 
be more likely to shop in a store selling ethical products.69 The importance of ethical standards 
through promoting sustainability has also been acknowledged by some of the larger transnational 
companies. For example Shell in its 2002 report on Sustainable Development emphasized the 
importance of adopting the ‘good neighbourhood principle’ with those communities with which it 
operates.70 The adoption of acceptable environmental standards in its activities is now an impor-
tant part of Shell’s overall programme.71
The second can be evidenced in the requirement to act socially responsibly now being codi-
fied into legislation. This is seen is the recently enacted Companies Act 2006 in the United King-
dom. Section 173 of the legislation which is contained in the part of directors’ obligations focuses 
upon the success of the company. When promoting the best interests of the company, directors 
are required to take account of amongst other things; the interests of the company’s employees; 
the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; the 
impact of a company’s operations on the community and the environment; the desirability of the 
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct.72 The requirement to 
take account of such factors is mandatory.73 A company’s success therefore is determined not just 
by having regard to its financial accounts and shareholder dividends but also to the relationship 
that it develops with its stakeholders. The explanatory notes accompanying the legislation sees 
this provision as giving effect to what is known as enlightened shareholder theory.74 Enlightened 
shareholder theory recognizes that acting in a manner which is socially responsible can have long 
term benefits for a company.75 It recognizes that shareholder and stakeholder interests are not mu-
tually exclusive and can be ‘relational and interdependent’.76
69 Ibid 25.
70 Shell oil Report 2002, People Planet and Profits. Here it is interesting to note that Shell adopted such a position in 
response to the negative international publicity that it received as a result of its joint venture with the Nigerian Gov-
ernment. Protests against environmental degradation as a result of oil extraction were responded to aggressively by 
the Nigerian Government. This aggressive response included human rights abuses. The fact that Shell was part of a 
joint venture linked indirectly if not directly to such abuses.
71 Ibid.
72 United Kingdom Companies Act 2006 s 173 (1).
73 As evidenced in the wording of the section ‘have regard to’.
74 Available at <http://www apsi.gov.uk/acts/acts 2006/ukpga20060046> accessed 28 June 2009.
75 Horrigan, ‘Directors’ Duties: Anglo-Australian Reform of Corporate Social Responsibility’, (2005/2006) 87 Reform 
17, 20.
76 Ibid.
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These developments are significant.77 Traditionally, companies and other corporate or com-
mercial entities have as a practice attempted to externalize the negative aspects of their activities.78 
In this context there is a term known as externalities. An externality is where a person/company/ 
entity imposes costs/damage on another person or third party through its actions without compen-
sating them for such loss or damage.79 Therefore the negative action and its detrimental impact is 
displaced onto the community or society at large. An example of this can be seen in a decision 
by a company to close an operation or plant which it has operated in a particular community for a 
number of years. Such a local operation may have contributed to the overall success of the com-
pany. Closure for the local community will mean job loses and closure of various businesses due 
to the overall local economic downturn. This is what is meant by displacing the consequences of 
a negative action on the community at large. The recent developments requiring companies to see 
themselves within the social matrix in which they operate has seen a growing expectation on the 
part of companies to internalize these externalities.80 Sometimes this occurs through regulation 
for example with regards to environmental practices. At other times it comes about through social 
pressure with the community at large making it clear that they expect the adoption by commercial 
activities of ethical practices.81 In this regard there are varying degrees of pressure or enforcement 
to internalize negative impacts of the commercial activity. Such developments, it can be appreci-
ated are significant. This leads to the second issue with regards to the possibility of ethical invest-
ment being incorporated into investment strategies of superannuation trusts. That is the influence 
that the superannuation trusts can exhibit as institutional investors.
B. The Impact of the Superannuation Trust as an Institutional Investor
The significance that superannuation trusts as institutional investors can have on the corporate 
governance and commercial direction is seen in the extent of their investor power. When com-
menting on the United Kingdom experience it was noted that superannuation funds, insurance 
companies and other large institutions own one half or more of the shares of all listed companies 
in the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.82 In Australia as of March 2007, the super-
annuation fund industry held approximately A$425.6 billion in the Australian equity market (ap-
proximately 28 per cent of the local market).83 Ali notes that superannuation funds reunite owner-
ship and control in commercial activities. These funds pool the collective wealth of Australians 
77 In acknowledging the significance of such developments it also needs to be noted that while the UK legislation makes 
it mandatory for account to be taken of the interests of named stakeholders, the named stakeholders are not provided 
through the legislation any means of enforcing such a requirement.
78 Thomas Clark International Corporate Governance, a Comparative Approach, (2007) 68.
79 Paul U Ali ‘Ethical Finance: Can Ethical objectives be Achieved Through Financial Investments?’ (2008) 26 C&SLJ 
127, 132.
80 Ibid 133.
81 There are various studies to support this. For example in 1995 a study carried out on behalf of a Canadian Union indi-
cated that over 92% of Canadians would choose to buy products made ethically if given the choice between ‘ethical’ 
and ‘regular’ products. (Christopher L Avery, Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change, Amnesty Interna-
tional UK, 24).
82 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, ‘Trustees and their Broader Community: Where Duty, Morality and Ethics Converge’. 
The Australian Law Journal Vol 70 March (1996) 205, 206.
83 Australian Bureau of Statistics. Managed Funds (Cat No 5655) (1st March 2007), 1.
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and then invest on their behalf through acquiring equity in Australian Corporations.84 This in turn 
provides them with significant shareholder power meaning that they can have considerable influ-
ence over the corporate behaviour hence the linkage of ownership and control.85 In this way they 
can promote social and environment objectives.86
It is suggested that there are two ways that superannuation schemes as institutional inves-
tors can promote ethical behavior through ethical investments. The first is through investing in 
targeted companies. This can be done to either encourage or acknowledge ethical practices. The 
second is through constricting finance or deliberately choosing not to invest in particular enter-
prises.87 Given the amount of finance that the Australian Superannuation fund has to invest, a 
clear decision to selectively avoid investing in companies whose practices contravene acceptable 
environmental or socially acceptable standards is going to exclude such excluded companies from 
a significant pool of finance.
The targeted financing of companies means that the institutional shareholders acquire a sig-
nificant shareholding in the company and can influence corporate behavior through voting and 
other rights of a shareholder. This is sometimes known as ‘shareholder engagement’.88 Engage-
ment goes further than voting and involves active dialogue with the company about the adoption 
of appropriate ethical standards and practices. The ability to undertake such engagement arises 
directly out of being a shareholder. However for this to be effective there would need to be a 
clearly stated objective for the superannuation funds to use their voting power to promote ethical 
practices. At the moment many funds are investing funds of a very large number of people for 
whom there is a considerable variance of political, social and moral views.89 To achieve ethical in-
vestment guidelines which would be in accord with such divergent views would be very difficult 
if not impossible.
Therefore, while there are solid reasons for justifying ethical investment, the possible and 
sometimes clear conflict between ethical investment and traditional investment obligations re-
mains. There is a need to either reconcile or manage this conflict. one method which is suggested 
by Rosy Thorton which makes a good deal of sense is to include the provision for ethical invest-
ment in the trust instrument.90 This prima facie would enable the trustees to implement an ethical 
policy without legal or practical difficulty.91 There is however one qualification to this. That is 
that the terms are defined with sufficient clarity.92 The guidelines would need to be articulated in 
a manner which enabled the trustees to feel comfortable when making their investment choices. 
The difficulty however with private schemes at least is to ensure that beneficiaries support such 
guidelines which as just noted is very difficult. This leads Rosy Thornton to raise the question 
84 Paul U Ali ‘Ethical Finance: Can Ethical objectives be Achieved Through Financial Investments?’ (2008) 26 C&SLJ 
127, 130.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid 133.
88 Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investments: a Case of Disjointed Thinking’, Cambridge Law Journal, 67 (2) July 2008, 
396, 402.
89 This was a point noted in Cowan and Others v Scargill and Others [1985] 1 Ch 270, 288.
90 Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investments: a Case of Disjointed Thinking’, Cambridge Law Journal, 67(2) July 2008, 296, 
421.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
2009 Ethical Investment in Superannuation Funds 109
about the appropriateness of superannuation trusts through ethical investment being used as vehi-
cles to promote environmentally and socially responsible behavior.93 This is a relevant question 
and it highlights the challenges of incorporating ethic principles into investment decisions regard-
ing superannuation trusts. While noting these challenges, it is the position of this paper that given 
the investment influence of superannuation funds and the fact that society generally seems to be 
requiring commercial entities to adopt ethical practices and internalize externalities, it is appropri-
ate for superannuation schemes to be involved in and promoting the use of ethical investment. The 
challenge is how to reconcile the different concerns and priorities. The New Zealand Government 
controlled superannuation fund to ensure provision of a base provision of superannuation pay-
ments for all of the population over 65, provides, it is submitted an example and model of how this 
can be achieved.
v. new ZeaLand superannuaTion fund
As a part of its commitment to the concept of a welfare state, New Zealand provides a flat rate of 
universal superannuation to people who are over 65.94 Given the ageing population, it was decided 
to establish a government operated superannuation fund which had sufficient resources to meet 
the present and future costs of New Zealand superannuation.95 This came about as the result of a 
reasonable amount of political consensus between the major parties.96 The body responsible for 
managing the fund is a Crown Entity which is a corporate body with perpetual succession97 known 
as the Guardians. This body is responsible for the investing of the fund and they are required to 
invest the Fund on a prudent, commercial basis and are required to administer the Fund in a man-
ner which is consistent with:
Best practice portfolio management; and
Maximizing return without undue risk to the Fund as a whole; and
Avoiding prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of the world 
community.98
Section 61 requires that there be a statement of investment policies, standards, and procedures. 
These standards, policies and procedures are required to cover amongst other things:
ethical investment, including policies, standards, or procedures for avoiding prejudice to New 
Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of the world community;99
the retention, exercise, or delegation of voting rights acquired through investments;100 and
the balance between risk and return in the overall Fund portfolio.101
What is significant in these provisions is that the commitment to ethical investment arises out 
of the need to uphold New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible citizen. The requirements of 
93 Ibid 422.
94 Currently the rate for a person living alone is $347.77 per week. (Taken from the first Schedule of the New Zealand 
Superannuation Act 2001).
95 New Zealand Superannuation Act 2001.
96 The political co operation and consensus was seen in 1994 when it was necessary to gradually increase the eligibility 
age for superannuation from 60-65. It was cost which necessitated such a move. 
97 New Zealand Superannuation Act 2001 s 48.
98 Ibid s 58.
99 Ibid s 61(d).
100 Ibid s 61(i).
101 Ibid s 61(e).
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responsible citizenship are articulated in different documents such as the codified international 
instruments drafted and enacted by the United Nations General Assembly.102 Importance is given 
to voting rights to ensure that the Guardians can have maximum influence on the bodies in which 
it invests.103 The requirement to find an appropriate balance between risk and return in the overall 
fund portfolio shows the commitment to standard practices of investment.104 What the legisla-
tion through its developed policies attempts to do here is to balance the requirement for prudent 
best practice investment with the need for ethical investment. In terms of ethical investment, the 
Guardians are guided by the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment which they are 
signatories to and the United Nations Global Compact.105 The principles for responsible invest-
ment place emphasis on the long term interests of beneficiaries. They acknowledge that environ-
mental, social and corporate governance issues can affect the performance of investment portfo-
lios.106 They also acknowledge that the adoption of such principles better aligns the companies to 
the broader objectives of society.107 The United Nations Global Compact which again the New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund has committed itself to encourages listed companies around the 
world to adopt international standards on human rights, working conditions, the environment and 
anti corruption.108 The Guardians give effect to ethical investment through voting, engagement 
and divestment.109
The effect of the voting rights within the context of ethical investment has already been can-
vassed. Institutional investors with significant shareholding can have a definite impact on the 
direction of the company in terms of affirmatively advocating socially responsible and policies 
through appropriate exercise of their voting rights. The impact can be even greater when a number 
of institutional investors reach an agreement to support the same policies in terms of responsible/
ethical investment. This is especially the case where the institutional investors combined share-
holding exceeds 50 per cent of the total share holding making the group majority shareholders 
thereby being able to determine policy. To ensure consistency in its voting behavior, the New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund has developed and committed itself to a set of voting guidelines.110 
These guidelines emphasise the importance of good and transparent corporate governance and 
provide guidance on such matters as the appointment and removal of directors and the determi-
nation of appropriate remuneration.111 The importance of transparency is contained in all of the 
guidelines. These guidelines acknowledge that the adoption of good corporate governance practic-
102 Such instruments have established and articulated reasonably clear international human rights standards.
103 NZ Superannuation Fund: Responsible Investment in Practise Reports available at <http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/ 
Index.asp> accessed 28 June 2009.
104 other traditional trust investment practices are included in s 61, New Zealand Superannuation Act 2001.
105 Available at <http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/index.asp.> accessed 28 June 2009.
106 Available at <http://www.unpri.org.> The New Zealand Superannuation fund is not the fund who is a signatory to 
these Principles. other New Zealand investors which are signatories include; Accident Compensation Corporation, 
New Zealand Fire Service Superannuation Scheme; Canterbury Community Trust; Trust Waikato; DNZ Property 
Group Limited and Trust Waikato.
107 Ibid.
108 Available at <http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/index.asp.> Responsible Investment Updates. Accessed 28 June 2009.
109 NZ Superannuation Fund: Responsible Investment in Practice Reports available at <http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/ 
Index.asp.> accessed 28 June 2009.
110 ISSNZ 2006 Guidelines pdf. Available at < http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/index.asp.> Responsible Investment - Re-
sponsible Investment Reports. Accessed 28 June 2009.
111 Ibid.
2009 Ethical Investment in Superannuation Funds 111
es goes hand in hand with a commitment to upholding core standards of human rights and labour 
conditions as well as being responsible in terms of environmental standards.
Engagement focuses upon investor dialogue with the Company board and executive manage-
ment to encourage ongoing evaluation of their policies and practices so as to determine whether 
their operations may directly or indirectly support human rights abuses or poor environment prac-
tices. This is a practice which the New Zealand Superannuation Fund Guardians are very much 
committed to.112 The aim of such engagement is to encourage companies operating in situations 
where human rights violations are a clear possibility if not a reality, to adopt strong human rights 
policies.113 Recent engagement has occurred through concern over human rights and environmen-
tal practices in the global steel industry. For example concern was expressed from different sec-
tors over some of the practices of Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold (Freeport). This led to the 
request by the Guardians for further information with regards to their human rights and environ-
ment practices. There has also been communication with other shareholders about these issues.114 
In this way engagement is not just occurring with the Board but also the other shareholders. This 
clearly strengthens the impact of engagement. one clear focus with regards to engagement on hu-
man rights issues is the adoption of acceptable labour standards. An example of such a concern 
arose in 2006 with regards to the labour conditions experienced by Brazilian charcoal producers. 
Charcoal is a product which is an element of the steel production chain.115 Concern was expressed 
that the steel industry and large steel users, such as car manufacturers, were potentially identified 
with these practices through using materials which had been produced in circumstances where in-
appropriate labour standards were being practiced.116 This led the Guardians and other concerned 
investors to meet with companies whose reputation, and potentially that of their brands, could be 
negatively affected due to sourcing from the Brazilian pig-iron industry.117 The response was var-
ied with some companies being prepared to give appropriate consideration to the dilemmas while 
other companies were not.118 Such an example is significant as it reflects concern being shown 
about indirect as well as direct association with human rights violations.
The engagement process encourages companies to take such issues concerning human rights 
and environmental standards seriously and to consider how they can be appropriately addressed. 
The fact that engagement occurs not just with the Company Board but also with other sharehold-
ers is significant and strengthens the effectiveness of engagement. This is especially the case when 
other shareholders have also committed themselves to the United Nations Principles for Responsi-
ble Develop and the United Nations Global Compact. This means that the concerned shareholders 
have a common focus.
Divestment has occurred in a number of situations. For example, in 2006 the Guardians ap-
proved divestment of Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd, Aliant Techsystems Inc, General 
Dynamic Corp, and Textron Systems Corp from the Funds portfolios due to the involvement of 
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 NZ Superannuation Fund: Responsible Investment in Practice Reports. Available at <http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz//
index.asp> accessed 28 June 2009.
115 Available at <http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/index.asp> Investment Strategy/Responsible Investment/ Responsible 
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116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
112 Waikato Law Review Vol 17
these companies in personal mines.119 They also excluded Maruha Group Inc due to its involve-
ment in the processing of whale meat.120 The fund managers have also been directed to exclude the 
securities of eleven companies involved in the manufacture of cluster munitions from the fund.121 
Further recent divestment has also occurred with companies involved in the tobacco industry.122 
Engagement was considered but was not considered to be an effective approach in such circum-
stances.123 This being said the UN Principles for Responsible Investment favour the process of 
engagement if at all possible as this promotes change in a co operative and positive manner.124 Be-
cause the New Zealand Superannuation fund’s single investment in a particular company would 
not be of a magnitude so as to impact on the company through divestment, it could be suggested 
that divestment essentially occurs where the guardians consider that certain practices such as the 
manufacturing of cluster bombs are so contrary to international law that complete distancing is 
required by New Zealand. Divestment achieves the appropriate distancing. It also amounts to a 
clear statement about New Zealand’s position on particular issues. Such examples could be said to 
be indicative of the fund adopting a socially dictated policy of investment. The foundation for this 
socially dictated policy lies in the legislation.125
The Guardians are clearly using the mechanisms identified earlier in the paper to promote 
ethical investing. However, the New Zealand Superannuation Fund is a fully government oper-
ated fund established by statute to administer and manage a fund to ensure the provision of su-
perannuation payments to all members of the population who have reached 65 years. Given these 
circumstances it is understandable that the Government wishes to maintain its reputation as a re-
sponsible member of the world community. This is a very different situation from a large private 
superannuation fund, responsible for investing employee and employer contributions for a large 
number of members with differing political, social and moral views. The members invest in order 
to obtain a guaranteed income during retirement. Trustees entrusted with the investment of these 
funds are required under traditional trust law to act in the beneficiaries best financial interests.
Perhaps a means of dealing with this clear conflict can be found in a former superannuation 
scheme which was introduced into New Zealand in 1973 but being repealed in 1976 was very 
short lived. This scheme was contained in the New Zealand Superannuation Corporation Act 
1973. This scheme required compulsory contribution by the employees and self employed peo-
ple.126 The contributions were placed into the New Zealand Superannuation Fund127 and managed 
by a Board who were Government appointed.128 Certain senior Government officials were also a 
part of this Board, which was responsible for the investment of the funds.129 Contribution to su-
perannuation was compulsory. However, it was possible for people to gain approval to invest in 
119 Ibid.
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121 NZ Superannuation Fund: Responsible Investment Updates available at <http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/index.asp> 
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alternative schemes which were approved by the Government.130 It needs to be emphasized that 
such schemes required statutory approval. Such a statutory scheme, it could be argued provides 
a justifiable basis to require superannuation schemes to adopt ethical investing practices when 
investing the funds. A government established scheme would expect investment practices to be 
adopted which were in accord with the country being a responsible global citizen. Approved alter-
native schemes would be expected to adopt the same standards. Such standards would be codified 
in respective legislation. The justification for this is:
i. The size of the superannuation investments which gives them a significant influence in the 
global economy. Such influence can be either positive or negative in terms of human rights or 
environmental matters;
ii. The fact that basic standards of human rights and environmental protection have been well 
articulated and justified, the implementation of such practices should be encouraged in every 
possible manner.131 States wishing to be good corporate citizens should be particular in ensur-
ing that no direct or indirect actions coming from within its jurisdiction support human rights 
breaches or inappropriate environmental practices;
iii. Corporate bodies should be encouraged to internalize their externalities.
A government operated contributory superannuation scheme requiring other approved private 
schemes to adopt the same standards of ethical investing would ensure consistency thereby pro-
viding equity among all members of all schemes. on this basis it would be a logical step to require 
private superannuation schemes governed and regulated by legislation such as the Australian Su-
perannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 to contain the same requirements for ethical invest-
ment. Such a requirement could be incorporated into the covenants in section 52 of the legislation 
which have been discussed earlier in the paper. other amendments would also be required with 
regards to reporting requirements, monitoring and supervision. In this manner it is the government 
who is the embodiment of the people which establishes the parameters for ethical investment. 
Such parameters would be based upon the United Nations Principles for Responsible Develop-
ment and other relevant international documents which jurisdictions such as Australia and New 
Zealand have committed themselves to. This addresses the issue relating to diverging views of 
beneficiaries on social and political matters in different private funds. The restrictive parameters 
that a State adopts, is to uphold its international reputation and to contribute to the advancement of 
internationally accepted standards. The adoption of such an approach would require further regu-
lation on the part of the Australian and New Zealand legislatures.
vi. concLusion
Superannuation schemes exist to ensure adequate retirement income to those who contribute to 
such schemes. The trustees of such schemes must manage the fund in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries. This means their financial interests which in turn justifies a narrow investment focus 
using traditional investment strategies. However given the magnitude that superannuation invest-
ments have achieved over recent years, considerable influence can be exerted by these schemes 
on the commercial entities that they chose to invest in. Given such influence and the growing 
commitment to responsible investment practices, it is only appropriate that ethical investment 
130 Ibid s 75.
131 Louis Henkin, ‘International Law: Politics, Values and Functions’, contained in: 216 Collected Courses of The Hague 
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practices are adopted to ensure that the funds contribute to the advancement of universal human 
rights and labour practices standards and the exercising of responsible practices in environmental 
matters. To avoid placing trustees in an unfair conflict situation between traditional and ethical 
investment obligations, it is important to incorporate the requirement of responsible ethical invest-
ment through legislation and regulation. Such regulation must also still require a well managed 
investment portfolio which spreads risk as the New Zealand Superannuation Act 2001 does. The 
trustees and Guardians must still act in the best interests of the beneficiaries and this means their 
financial interests. However they are restricted in their investment decisions and practices through 
the appropriate legislation requiring the adoption of ethical practice which they must comply with. 
As Sir Robert Megarry noted in Cowan, trustees must act in the best interests of beneficiaries but 
in a manner which does not break the law.132
132 Cowan and Others v Scargill and Others [1985] 1 Ch 270, 287.
